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"Rogue State Behavior" published on by Oxford University Press.

International audience ; The expression Rogue States appeared in the early 1980s in the United States and has been the object of constant use by successive American administrations. However, it is not based on a reliable definition and appears inconsistent from a legal point of view. The category that it is trying to identify is in reality of variable geometry, according to the interests of the States which use this expression. Its use is controlled by political motives, seeking the stigmatization of a competitor or an adversary, without its effectiveness in terms of changing the behavior of a State being really demonstrated. ; L'expression de Rogue States est apparue au début des années 1980 aux Etats-Unis et elle a fait l'objet d'une utilisation constante de la part des Administrations américaines successives. Pourtant, elle ne repose pas sur une définition sûre et apparaît peu consistante sur le plan juridique. La catégorie qu'elle tente d'identifier est en réalité à géométrie variable, au gré des intérêts des Etats qui ont recours à cette expression. Son utilisation est commandée par des motifs politiques, recherchant la stigmatisation d'un concurrent ou d'un adversaire, sans pour autant que son efficacité quant au changement de comportement d'un Etat soit réellement démontrée.

International audience ; The expression Rogue States appeared in the early 1980s in the United States and has been the object of constant use by successive American administrations. However, it is not based on a reliable definition and appears inconsistent from a legal point of view. The category that it is trying to identify is in reality of variable geometry, according to the interests of the States which use this expression. Its use is controlled by political motives, seeking the stigmatization of a competitor or an adversary, without its effectiveness in terms of changing the behavior of a State being really demonstrated. ; L'expression de Rogue States est apparue au début des années 1980 aux Etats-Unis et elle a fait l'objet d'une utilisation constante de la part des Administrations américaines successives. Pourtant, elle ne repose pas sur une définition sûre et apparaît peu consistante sur le plan juridique. La catégorie qu'elle tente d'identifier est en réalité à géométrie variable, au gré des intérêts des Etats qui ont recours à cette expression. Son utilisation est commandée par des motifs politiques, recherchant la stigmatisation d'un concurrent ou d'un adversaire, sans pour autant que son efficacité quant au changement de comportement d'un Etat soit réellement démontrée.

International audience ; The expression Rogue States appeared in the early 1980s in the United States and has been the object of constant use by successive American administrations. However, it is not based on a reliable definition and appears inconsistent from a legal point of view. The category that it is trying to identify is in reality of variable geometry, according to the interests of the States which use this expression. Its use is controlled by political motives, seeking the stigmatization of a competitor or an adversary, without its effectiveness in terms of changing the behavior of a State being really demonstrated. ; L'expression de Rogue States est apparue au début des années 1980 aux Etats-Unis et elle a fait l'objet d'une utilisation constante de la part des Administrations américaines successives. Pourtant, elle ne repose pas sur une définition sûre et apparaît peu consistante sur le plan juridique. La catégorie qu'elle tente d'identifier est en réalité à géométrie variable, au gré des intérêts des Etats qui ont recours à cette expression. Son utilisation est commandée par des motifs politiques, recherchant la stigmatisation d'un concurrent ou d'un adversaire, sans pour autant que son efficacité quant au changement de comportement d'un Etat soit réellement démontrée.

This article examines whether rogue states are more aggressive in challenging other states' claims to territory in comparison with non-rogue states. Rogue states are defined as those which systematically violate accepted international human rights norms of gender and ethnic nondiscrimination and protection from state repression. Hypotheses suggest that states that regularly violate international human rights norms are more likely to challenge other states' territorial claims and that dyads with rogue states are more likely to experience territorial claims. Empirical analyses of data from two datasets on territorial claims provide support to the theory. Territorial claims are more likely In politically relevant dyads as the potential challenger's rogue state score increases. Territorial claims are also more likely to emerge as the minimum rogue state score in a dyad increases. The substantive effect of rogue status is sizable, increasing the chances for a territorial claim by as much as 500%. [Reprinted by permission; copyright Sage Publications Ltd.]

This article examines whether rogue states are more aggressive in challenging other states' claims to territory in comparison with non-rogue states. Rogue states are defined as those which systematically violate accepted international human rights norms of gender and ethnic nondiscrimination and protection from state repression. Hypotheses suggest that states that regularly violate international human rights norms are more likely to challenge other states' territorial claims and that dyads with rogue states are more likely to experience territorial claims. Empirical analyses of data from two datasets on territorial claims provide support to the theory. Territorial claims are more likely in politically relevant dyads as the potential challenger's rogue state score increases. Territorial claims are also more likely to emerge as the minimum rogue state score in a dyad increases. The substantive effect of rogue status is sizable, increasing the chances for a territorial claim by as much as 500%.

Despite its recent efforts at negotiation, the US traditionally has been more confrontational in its approach to Iran than European countries, which have urged closer ties with Tehran. In 2002, scholar Robert Kagan argued that the dove-hawk divide was a function of a disparity in military might: Because the US remained a great power even as European defense budgets shrank, it was more likely to flex its muscles. However, new research indicates that a better predictor lies in an unlikely place: domestic courts and prisons. A study by Amsterdam-based political scientists Wolfgang Wagner and Michal Onderco found that how countries treat criminals at home helps predict how they will deal with 'deviance' on the global stage -- particularly by so-called rogue states. Wagner and Onderco argue that it is a matter of cultural norms transferring across arenas. Realizing that, for other states, there's a different mindset -- this could contribute to some better understanding among the Western states of how each approaches international bad guys, Wagner notes. Adapted from the source document.